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A GENERAL ENCRYPTION SCHEME USING TWO-SIDED
MULTIPLICATIONS WITH ITS CRYPTANALYSIS
VITALI˘I ROMAN’KOV
Abstract. We show that many known schemes of the public key ex-
change protocols in the algebraic cryptography, that use two-sided mul-
tiplications, are the specific cases of the general scheme of such type.
In most cases, such schemes are built on platforms that are subsets of
the linear spaces. They have been repeatedly compromised by the lin-
ear decomposition method introduced by the first author. The method
allows to compute the exchanged keys without computing the private
data and therefore without solving the algorithmic problems on which
the assumptions are based. We demonstrate that this method can be
successfully applied to the general scheme, thus it is in some sense uni-
versal.
1. Introduction
We show that many known schemes of the public key exchange protocols
in the algebraic cryptography, that use two-sided multiplications, are the
specific cases of the general scheme of such type. In most cases, such schemes
are built on platforms that are subsets of linear spaces, then they can be
compromised by the linear decomposition method introduced by the first
author. See for instance the monograph [1], and papers [2], [3], [4], [5],
[6]. The method allows to compute the exchanged keys without computing
the private data and therefore without solving the algorithmic problems on
which the assumptions are based. We demonstrate that this method can be
successfully applied to the general scheme, introduced in this paper, thus it
is in some sense universal.
Some of the schemes under investigation were proposed by Andrecut [7],
Wang et al. [8], Stickel [9], B. and T. Harley [10], [11], Shpilrain and Ushakov
[12]. Some other schemes were described in [13] and [14]. The schemes using
conjugation, for example the well-known scheme by Ko, Lee and al. [15],
that is a non-commutative version of the classical Diffie-Hellman scheme
(see [16]), can be treated as schemes of the investigated type too.
The general scheme proceeds as follows. Let G be an algebraic system
with associative multiplication, for example group, chosen as the platform.
Further in the paper, G is a group. We assume that G is a subset of a finitely
dimensional linear space V . Firstly, a set of public elements g1, ..., gk ∈ G is
established. Then the correspondents, Alice and Bob, publish sequentially
elements of the form φa,b(f) = afb; a, b ∈ G, where f ∈ G is a given or
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previously built element. The parameters a, b are private. The exchanged
key has the form
(1) K = φal,bl(φal−1,bl−1(...(φa1,b1(gi)...)) = alal−1...a1gib1...bl−1bl.
We suppose that Alice chooses parameters a, b in a given finitely generated
subgroup A of G, and Bob picks up parameters a, b in a finitely generated
subgroup B of G to construct their transformations of the form φa,b. Then,
under some natural assumptions about G,A and B, we show that each
intruder can efficiently calculate the exchanged key K without calculation
the transformations used in the scheme.
Foundations of the linear decomposition method can be found in [1] (see
also [2] and [3]). It can be applied only when the platform group G is a part
of a finite-dimensional linear space V . For example, G ≤ GLn(F) is a linear
group of size n that is a subset of the full matrix algebra Mn(F) over a field
F. In many other cases when the platform group G is not linear, or G is
linear but the dimension of V is too large, the linear decomposition method
can be changed by the non-linear decomposition method (see [17]). It works
when the platform group G is a finitely generated nilpotent group or, more
generally, polycyclic group. The class of polycyclic groups has been many
times proposed as a source of good platforms for cryptographic schemes and
protocols. See [18], [19], [20].
The transformations under discussion satisfy the equalities φa,b ◦ φc,d =
φca,bd and include the unit element ǫ = φ1,1. The inverse of φa,b is φa−1,b−1 .
Usually in the considering schemes, there are two finitely generated sub-
groupsA,B ⊆ G, where the correspondences pick up their parameters. Alice
chooses randomly elements in A, and Bob picks up randomly parameters in
B. In many schemes all elements of the subgroups A and B are assumed
to be pairwise commuting, i.e., for every a ∈ A and every b ∈ B we have
ab = ba. Then all the transformations generate the subgroup S(G,A,B) of
G.
To get the exchanged key K in (1) we need to apply to element gi the
transformation φu,v, where u = alal−1...a1, v = b1...bl−1bl. We assume that
all the transformations φaj ,bj have been used in the public data. In other
words, for every pair aj , bj the list of public data contains c and d such that
d = φaj ,bj(c). Then also c = φ
−1
aj ,bj
(d), thus the transformation φ−1aj ,bj can
be considered as used too. Alice and Bob compute K using their private
data. Alice knows a part of all transformations φaj ,bj , and Bob knows the
complement of this part. In the follows section we’ll show how we can effi-
ciently compute K under some natural assumptions on G,A and B without
knowing of any of the private data. Note, that we don’t compute any pair of
elements aj , bj . It turns out that it doesn’t matter who of the correspondents
chooses concrete private elements aj , bj , parameters of the transformation
φaj ,bj . Sometimes some schemes use sums of elements ϕa,b(f) (see [11] and
[10]). A variation of the method of linear decomposition allows to compute
the exchanged key in these cases too (see Example 3 below).
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2. Main Lemmas
Let G be a platform group in a key exchanged scheme. Suppose that
G is a subset of a finite dimensional linear space V. Two correspondents,
Alice and Bob, agree about an element h ∈ G and two finitely generated
subgroups A and B of G given by their finite generating sets. Suppose that
each element a ∈ A commutes with every element b ∈ B. All these data are
public.
Then the correspondences beginning wth h repeatedly publish elements
φai,bi(u) = aiubi, where ai, bi ∈ A (Alice), and φcj ,dj (u) = cjudj , where
cj, dj ∈ B (Bob), where u is one of the given or previously constructed
elements. The exchanged key has the form
(2) K = φǫ1f1,g1(φ
ǫ2
f2,g2
(...(φǫtft ,gt(h)...)),
where every pair (fr, gr) coincides either with a pair of the form (ai, bi), or
with the pair of the form (cj , dj), ǫr ∈ {±1}.
The following lemma shows how we can efficiently construct bases of linear
subspaces of V , that are generated by elements of G of the certain form.
Different versions of this lemma have been proved in [1], [2] and [3].
Lemma 2.1. Let A = gp(a1, ..., ak) be a finitely generated subgroup of group
G, that is a subset of a finite dimensional linear space V over a field F, and
h be a fixed element of G. Suppose that all main computations over V ,
i.e., addition, multiplication to scalar, can be efficiently done . Then each
finite set of linear equations over F can be efficiently solved. Then we can
efficiently construct a base E = {e1, ..., es} of the linear subspace Lin(AhA),
generated by all elements of the form ahb, a, b ∈ A.
Proof. Consider the arbitrary ordered, beginning with h, set of all elements
of the form cǫhdη , where ǫ, η ∈ {±1}, and c, d are elements of the form ai,
or 1. This set is called the first list and is denoted as L1. The following
operations will give a part {e1, e2, ...} of the constructing base E. This part
is a base of the linear subspace Lin(L1):
1) Let e1 = h.
2) Let the elements {e1, ..., et} of the base E have been constructed. We
take the following element cǫhdη in L1. If it is linearly depended with the
constructed elements we delete it. If it doesn’t happen we add it to the set
of constructed elements, i.e., it is included to E.
When L1 is over we form a new arbitrary ordered list L2 consisting of all
elements of the form cǫejd
ν , where ej is an element of the part of E, that
has been constructed after L1 ended (with exception e1).
Further, we consequently consider the elements of L2 and operate as in
2). After L2 is over, and we get a part of E, that is a base of the linear
subspace of V generated by L1 and L2, we construct the third list, and so
on.
3) The process ends when the operation with a list Li doesn’t add any
new element of E.
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To explain the assertion 3) we note that every new list consists of the
elements of the previous list multiplied in the both sides to the generat-
ing elements of A, or to their inverses (one of these factors can be 1). Let
X = {a±11 , ..., a
±1
k , 1}. Then L1 ⊆ XhX, L2 ⊆ X
2hX2, and so on. If af-
ter operation with Li+1 ⊆ X
i+1hXi+1 no one element was added to E,
then Li+1 lies in the subspace generated by all previously constructed el-
ements of E, i.e., Xi+1hXi+1 ⊆ Lin(∪ij=1X
jhXj). Then Xi+2hXi+2 ⊆
X(Lin(∪ij=1X
jhXj))X ⊆ Lin(∪i+1j=1X
jhXj) ⊆ Lin(∪ij=1X
jhXj). Hence
operations with Li+2 doesn’t add new elements to E. It is clear, that the
considering subspace coincides with the subspace generated by the all lists.
It follows that the number of all lists that add new elements to E doesn’t
exceed the dimension of V.

The following lemma is a key statement for the forthcoming cryptanalysis.
We suppose that all given above agreements are satisfied.
Lemma 2.2. Let G be a group, that is a subset of a finite dimensional linear
space V over a field F. Assume that all assumptions about main operations
over V given in the Lemma 2.1 are satisfied. Let
v = φa,b(u),
where a, b ∈ A are Alice’s private parameters (similar statement is true for
Bob’s private parameters).
Then for every element of the form w = φc,d(u), where c, d ∈ B (in other
words w ∈ BuB), we can efficiently construct z = φa,b(w) based on the
structure of V.
Proof. Obviously v ∈ AuA. Let E = {a1ub1, ..., arubr}, ai, bi ∈ A, be a
basis of Lin(AuA), that is efficiently obtained by Lemma 2.1. By the Gauss
elimination process we get the unique expression
(3) v =
r∑
i=1
αiaiubi, αi ∈ F.
All the values in the right hand side of (3) are known now. We substitute
to the right hand side of (3) w instead of u. Since elements of A and B are
pairwise commuting we obtain
r∑
i=1
αiaiwbi =
r∑
i=1
αiaicudbi = c(
r∑
i=1
αiaiubi)d
(4) = cvd = caubd = a(cud)b = awb = z.

Now we formulate a mnemonic rule of an efficient constructing of a specific
element following by the Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2:
v = φa,b(u) (a, b ∈ A) & w ∈ BuB ⇒ φa,b(w);
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(5) v = φc,d(u) (c, d ∈ B) & w ∈ AuA ⇒ φc,d(w).
It means that if we find a basis of the underlined linear subspace by the
Lemma 2.1 then from the elements u and v in the left hand side of the
corresponding part of the rule, we can efficiently construct the image of w
in the right hand side of the rule.
3. Examples
Example 1. We describe the protocol 1 by Wang et al. [8]. In this protocol
one of the Artin braid groups is proposed as the platform.
Let Bn denote the Artin braid group on n strings, n ∈ N. R. Lawrence
described in 1990 a family of so called Lawrence representations of Bn.
Around 2001 S. Bigelow [21] and D. Krammer [22] independently proved
that all braid groups Bn are linear. Their work used the Lawrence-Krammer
representations ρn : Bn → GLn(n−1)/2(Z[t
±1, s±1]) that has been proved
faithful for every n ∈ N. One can effectively find the image ρn(g) for every
element g ∈ Bn. Moreover, there exists an effective procedure to recover a
braid g ∈ Bn from its image ρn(g). It was shown in [23] that it can be done
in O(2m3logdt) multiplications of entries in ρn(g). Here m = n(n−1)/2 and
dt is a parameter that can be effectively computed by ρn(g). See [23] for
details.
Thus we can assume that the platform G is a part of a finite dimensional
linear space V.
Alice and Bob agree about group G and a random element h ∈ G, as well
as about two finitely generated subgroups A and B such that ab = ba for
every pair a ∈ A and b ∈ B. These data are public.
The algorithm works as follows.
Alice chooses four elements: c1, c2, d1, d2 ∈ A, then computes and pub-
lishes x = d1c1hc2d2 for Bob.
Bob chooses six elements: f1, f2, g1, g2, g3, g4 ∈ B, then computes and
publishes y = g1f1hf2g2 and w = g3f1xf2g4, for Alice.
Alice picks up two elements: d3, d4 ∈ A, then computes and publishes
z = d3c1yc2d4 and u = d
−1
1 wd
−1
2 , for Bob.
Bob computes and publishes v = g−11 zg
−1
2 for Alice.
Alice computes the key KA = d
−1
3 vd
−1
4 = c1f1hf2c2.
Bob computes the key KB = g
−1
3 ug
−1
4 = c1f1hf2c2, that is equal to KA.
Now Alice and Bob have the common secret key K = KA = KB .
Cryptanalysis. The following transformations were used in the protocol:
(6) φd1c1,c2d2 , φg1f1,f2g2 , φg3f1,f2g4 , φd3c1,c2d4 , φ
−1
d1,d2
, φ−1g1,g2 .
By direct computation we get an expression of K:
(7) K = φc1f1,f2c2(h) = φ
−1
d1,d2
(φd1c1,c2d2(φ
−1
g1,g2(φg1f1,f2g2(h)))).
We are going to show that the key K can be efficiently obtained by Lemmas
2.1 and 2.2.
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The output of the first transformation y = φg1f1,f2g2(h) is public.
The output of the second transformation φ−1g1,g2(y) can be efficiently ob-
tained by the mnemonic rule:
v = φ−1g1,g2(z) & y ∈ AzA ⇒ φ
−1
g1,g2(y) = f1hf2.
The output of the third transformation can be efficiently obtained by the
mnemonic rule:
x = φd1c1,c2d2(h) & f1hf2 ∈ BhB ⇒ φd1c1,c2d2(f1hf2) = d1c1f1hf2c2d2.
The output of the fourth transformation can be efficiently obtained by
the mnemonic rule:
u = φ−1d1,d2(w) & d1c1f1hf2c2d2 ∈ BwB ⇒ φ
−1
d1,d2
(d1c1f1hf2c2d2)
= c1f1hf2c2 = K.
Thus we have K.
Example 2. Well known protocol by Ko et al. [15] usually is called non-
commutative analog of Diffie-Hellman protocol. The authors of [15] proposed
one of the Artin braid groups Bn, n ∈ N, as a platform. On the matrix rep-
resentation of Bn see the previous example.
The agreements about G = Bn, h ∈ G, and A and B are the same as in
the previous example.
Now the algorithm works as follows.
Alice chooses randomly a ∈ A, computes and publishes ha = aha−1 for
Bob.
Bob picks up randomly b ∈ B, computes and publishes hb = bhb−1 for
Alice.
Alice computes the key KA = (h
b)a = hab.
Bob computes the key KB = (h
a)b = hba.
Since ab = ba they get the exchanged secret key K = KA = KB .
Cryptanalysis. We see that
(8) K = abha−1b−1 = φa,a−1(φb,b−1(h)).
The output of the first transformation hb = φb,b−1(h) is public.
The output of the second transformation can be efficiently obtained by
the mnemonic rule:
ha = φa,a−1(h) & h
b ∈ BhB ⇒ φa,a−1(h
b) = K.
Thus we have K.
Example 3. We describe the protocol proposed by B. and T. Harley [10],
[11]. Let G be a finitely generated commutative subgroup of the general
linear group GLn(F) over a field F. These data are public.
The algorithm works as follows.
Bob chooses randomly y ∈ Fn and b ∈ G, computes and publishes yb.
Alice wants to send a message x ∈ Fn to Bob. She chooses randomly
a1, a ∈ G, then computes and publishes (xa, yba1) for Bob.
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Bob chooses randomly b1, b2 ∈ G, then computes and publishes (xab1, ya1b2),
for Alice.
Alice computes (xb1, yb2) and then publishes xb1 − yb2 for Bob.
Bob computes x− yb2b
−1
1 and then recovers x.
Bob can use yb in forthcoming sessions.
Cryptanalysis. Since G is commutative we can assume that the correspon-
dences use arbitrary right hand side multiplications ρc = φ1,c, c ∈ G, and
that A = B = G. The arguments of the Lemma 2.1 allow to construct bases
of subspaces of the form Lin(gG), g ∈ G. The assumption w ∈ BuB of the
Lemma 2.2 automatically done. Now the mnemonic rule is simpler. The
group G generates a finite dimensional subspace Lin(G) of GLn(F). Every
ρc is uniquely extended to Lin(G). It follows that the secret element in the
protocol can be efficiently computed as in the previous examples.
In the protocol, the public elements yb, xa and xb1 − yb2 are given,
the transformations ρb1 , ρa1 , ρa1b2b−1 have been used. The first transfor-
mation corresponds to (xa, xab1), the second transformation corresponds to
(yb, yba1), and the third transformation corresponds to (yb, ya1b2).
Then we have:
(9) x = ρ−1b1 (xb1 − yb2) + ρ
−1
b1
(ρ−1a1 (ya1b2)).
Both terms are efficiently computed by the mnemonic rule.
4. Complexity of the proposed algorithms
The algorithm described in the Lemma 2.1 gives a base of the subspace
of the given finitely dimensional linear space. It can be done by the Gauss
elimination process. In every case we need to determine existing of a solution
only. Note that the Gauss algorithm runs for matrix of size (t× s) in O(t2s)
steps. Let r be the dimension of V. Then r is a number of equations in each
of the considering systems of linear equations. The number of variables
doesn’t exceed r because it is equal to the number previously included basic
elements. Hence, every time we use not more than O(r3) operations. The
total number of considering lists doesn’t exceed r because every such list
adds at least one new basic elements to the constructing base. Every list
contains not more than 4k2r elements. The total number of such elements
doesn’t exceed 2k2r2. Hence we have (very crude) an upper bound O(k2r5)
of such operations.
In some cases we need to estimate a number of operations giving some
previous representation of the platform group G by matrices, as well as a
number of operations needed to compute the inverse map to G. For example,
in [23] was shown that the standard form of any element g of Bn can be
recovered with its linear image by not more than O(n3log2dt) operations.
Here dt is some efficiently computed parameter depending from g. Note, that
the linear image of g is determined in linear time with respect to the length
of g.
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In the algorithm of the Lemma 2.2 we use the Gauss elimination process.
In the case, this process finds the unique solution. Since a total number of
base constructions is not more than the total number of computations in
this base, the estimation keeps its form: O(k2r5).
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